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ARGUMENT
A.

A SETTLEMENT BASED UPON THE TWO LETTERS
OF COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED.

CTX in its Brief claims that the terms of the settlement
are contained in the two letters exchanged by counsel.
several problems with this assertion.

There are

First, the terms discussed

in the letters exchanged by counsel were never agreed to by all the
parties; Second, letters were never exchanged by counsel for all
the parties involved; and finally, CTX proceeded contrary to the
terms in the letters, both in this case and the other cases
discussed in the letters.
Both of the letters exchanged required a global settlement of a total of five cases.

CTX's letter of March 14, 1995

(record 720-721) requires "a global settlement of all of the above
referenced cases," a total of five cases were referenced in the
letter.

Some of the other cases involved Rukavina as a party, and

some of the other cases did not involve Rukavina as a party.

One

of the case, CTX Properties v. Eloise Barney, involved another
party, i.e. Eloise Barney, who was not even represented by Shane
Smith or Budge Call, of Smith & Hanna.
Eloise Barney was represented by attorney Lynn Mabey of
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey.

The March 14, 1995, letter was addressed

L. Benson Mabey, Esq., Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey, 124 South 600 East,
Suite 100, Salt Lake City Utah, 84102 and the paragraph designated
number 4 in the letter deals directly with the settlement terms of
CTX Properties v. Eloise Barney.
- 1-

Therefore, Rukavina and his

counsel could not have accepted these terms on behalf of Eloise
Barney, and thus, could not have accepted all of the terms of the
March 14, 1995 letter in the March 16, 1995 letter.

All the

parties did not agree or accept the terms set forth in the two
letters of

counsel, and therefore, the court should not have

enforced a settlement based on these two letters.
Furthermore, the letter sent by Rukavina's counsel, dated
March 16, 1995, did not accept the terms as proposed in the March
14, 1995 letter for Rukavina.

In fact, the March 16, 1995 letter

rejected and made modifications to the terms proposed in the March
14, 1995 letter.

Thus, Rukavina, in effect, rejected the proposal

in the March 14, 1995 letter and made a counteroffer to CTX.

CTX,

however, did not accept this counteroffer, refused to settle all
the cases, and proceeded with litigation in this case, and in the
other cases.
The parties knew and understood there was no settlement
reached on the terms discussed
conduct is evidence of this.

in the letters.

The parties'

The parties did not execute the

Settlement Agreement and CTX elected to continue with litigation in
all the cases1.

CTX even continued with its motions in this case,

which were heard on April 3, 1995, more than two weeks after the
letters were exchanged in this case.
l

This alone, would estop CTX

. CTX claims that the fact it decided not to seek enforcement
of the settlement in the other cases is irrelevant; however, it is
relevant when the agreement CTX claimed was reached between the
parties in the two letters was an agreement to settle all the
cases.
Furthermore, the actions of CTX in proceeding with this
case alone is sufficient to show no agreement was reached and/or to
constitute waiver and estoppel.
'

•

-

2

-

from claiming that a settlement was reached.

CTX cannot pursue,

and the court cannot rule, on CTX's Motions in April of 1995, and
then go back and enforce a settlement allegedly reached through
letters exchanged a month earlier in March 19952.
Moreover, CTX in its Brief claims that the court made a
finding

that

the parties'

failure

to

reach an agreement

was

"comparatively unsubstantial" to bar enforcement of the settlement
agreement.

The court never made such a finding and CTX has failed

to cite this alleged finding to the record, as required under the
rules.

To reach a settlement there must be a meeting of the minds,

as in contract law, if the court did find that the failure to reach
an agreement was unsubstantial, such a finding would be in error.
Finally, this is not a case of Rukavina simply trying to
welch out of an agreement.

All of the parties had not yet reached

an agreement and it was CTX who rejected Rukavina's counteroffer in
the March 16, 1995 letter and proceeded with litigation in this
case, as well as, in the other cases.
B.

THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT REQUIRED IN THE
TWO LETTERS COULD NOT BE UNILATERALLY
WAIVED BY CTX.

CTX's claim that the global settlement required in the
letters could simply be waived by CTX fails for several reasons.
First, the letter of March 16, 1995, did not simply accept the
terms of the March 14, 1995 letter as written.

2

It rejected and

. CTX's argument that it had to proceed with litigation is
not valid. CTX could have filed its Motion to Enforce Settlement
prior to these hearings. CTX did not file its Motion to Enforce
Settlement until after the hearings.
- 3 -

made modifications to a number of terms in the March 14, 1995
letter, and therefore, constituted a rejection of the March 14,
1995 letter and a counteroffer.

Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. St.

George, 865 P.2d 1373, (Utah 1993) (a reply to an offer, though
purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires
performance of conditions, is not an acceptance but is a counteroffer) , accord

Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 1926).

Therefore, the global
requirement

settlement

was not

solely

of CTX, but also of Rukavina as contained

counteroffer of March 16, 1995.

the

in his

In fact, the modifications and

requirements of Rukavina contained in the March 16, 1995, letter
dealt with the settlement terms proposed in the other cases.
CTX also claims that only CTX was to benefit from the
global settlement.

This is simply not true. The global settlement

was not only to benefit CTX, but also Rukavina.

For example, in

the global settlement, Rukavina was to settle another case, in
which he was a party with a principal of CTX, styled Rukavina v.
Triatlantic.

This case is referenced in the letters, and in the

March 16, 1995 counteroffer of Rukavina, Triatlantic was to forgive
its judgment against Rukavina in this case.
March 16, 1995 letter, record 825) .

(See paragraph b of

Rukavina was obviously to

obtain a benefit from the global settlement; therefore, CTX cannot
simply waive this requirement.
C.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED CTX'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

The trial court should not have granted judgment on the
pleadings in this case.

In the pleadings filed by Rukavina he
- 4 -

claims that he is entitled to relief for a number of reasons, the
claim that he was the owner of the property pursuant to the lease
and the option to purchase contained in the lease was only one
assertion.
In accepting the allegations in Rukavina's pleadings as
true, the court could not have granted judgment on the pleadings
against Rukavina in this case. The court may have later found that
Rukavina

was

entitled

to relief,

including

possession of

the

property, under the other claims raised in the pleadings, including
the promises made by CTX, the waiver by CTX, the mutual mistake of
the parties at the time the option was entered into, or under the
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement entered into by CTX and
Barney, wherein CTX agrees

to honor

the lease and option on

Rukavina's behalf. The court's ruling that the option provision is
legally unenforceable, although in error, is not alone sufficient
to warrant a total judgment on the pleadings, as Rukavina may have
been entitled to relief under the other claims in his pleadings.
D.

THE TERMS OF THE OPTION ARE NOT TOO
INDEFINITE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The terms in the option provision are not too indefinite,
as a matter of law, to be enforceable.

A method was agreed to, at

the time, for calculating a purchase price for the property.

This

agreed method is definite enough for an option to purchase real
estate. Property Assistance v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 (Utah App.
1989).

The parties did not agree to negotiate a fair sales price

in the future, but only agreed to wait until the expiration of the
lease to obtain appraisals to determine the fair sales price.
- 5 -

The

language "to determine a fair sales price," is ambiguous.

It is

not known whether the parties had agreed on a method for calculating a sales pric§ using the appraisals, which were to be implemented at the time the lease expired; or whether the parties were going
to obtain the appraisals and then sit down and renegotiate a sales
price.
The undisputed affidavits show that the parties agreed on
a definite method to calculate the sales price, e.g. the average of
the two appraisals, and that the appraisals were simply to be
plugged into the previously agreed formula to determine the sales
price.

Parol evidence should have been considered by the court in

determining what the parties' intention was as to the language "to
determine a fair sales price." Property Assistance v. Roberts, Id.
E.

THE OPTION PROVISION IS NOT AN INTEGRATED
CONTRACT; THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED
PAROL EVIDENCE IN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION.

The

question

of

interpretation

of

a

contract

is a

question of law for the court. The court must determine by process
of interpretation what the writing means.

Before considering the

applicability of the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the
court must first determine whether the parties intended the writing
to be an

integrated

contract.

relevant evidence is admissible.
663, 665 (Utah 1985).

To resolve

this question any

Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d

The trial court erred in failing to first

determine and rule on the issue as to whether the option was
intended as integrated contract before ruling on the admissibility
of parol evidence.

Id. at 665.
- 6 -

The trial

court should have considered

all relevant

evidence, including the affidavits of the individuals negotiating
the contract, to determine if the contract was intended as an
integrated contract. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers, 277 UAR 58
(Ut.App. 1995) (when determining whether a contract is ambiguous,
any relevant evidence must be considered.

Other wise the determi-

nation of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely it is based
solely on the "extrinsic evidence" of the judge's own linguistic
education and experience.

Although the terms of an instrument may

seem clear to a particular reader -including a judge- this does not
rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the
agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should therefore
consider

any

intention).

credible

evidence

offered

to

show

the parties'

Id.

The undisputed

affidavits

submitted

reveal

that

the

option provision was not intended as an integrated contract.

The

affidavits set forth the specific terms agreed to in explanation of
the

language

used

in the

option provision

(last

sentence

of

paragraph 15) , stating that, "Each agent shall obtain a separate
appraisal and at that time a fair sales price shall be determined."
Furthermore, parol evidence should be considered when it
appears that a complete and binding agreement may be voidable for
fraud, duress, mutual mistake or the like, or it may be illegal.
Warner v. Sirstins 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Ut.App. 1992).

Such invali-

dating causes need not and generally do not appear on the face of
the writing.

Therefore, parol evidence may be admitted to show
- 7 -

mutual

mistake

occurring

when

both

parties,

at

the

time

of

contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or
vital fact, upon which they base their bargain.

Id. at 669.

This

is clearly shown in the affidavits submitted, as both parties
assumed

that

the

language

they

had

chosen was

sufficient

to

determine a definite purchase price for an enforceable option to
purchase.
Furthermore,

even

reading

the

face

of

the

contract

itself, indicates that the option provision was not intended as an
integrated contract.

Paragraph 15 states that "there are no terms

of this agreement different (sic) from any of the proceding (sic)
numbered paragraphs or in addition thereto except the following:"
(emphasis added).
provision
integrated

The option provision then follows.

therefore,
contract

clearly
and

the

was
court

not

intended

should

have

The option

as part

of

considered

an
all

relevant evidence in interpreting the option provision.
F,

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING RUKAVINA'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
REACHED IN CTX PROPERTIES V. BARNEY,

CTX cannot and does not argue the merits of this Motion.
The law in Utah is well settled that a third party beneficiary to
a contract has the right to enforce the terms of the contract.
This includes third party beneficiaries of settlement agreements.
L&A Drywall. Inc. v. Whitmore Construction, 608 P.2d 626
1980).

(Utah

See also Hansen v. Greenriver Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1104

(Ut.App. 1988).

- 8 -

CTX and Barney, entered into a Settlement Agreement in
CTX Properties v. Eloise C. Barney, Civil No. 900903134 PR, and as
a condition of that settlement, Barney requested that CTX honor the
option provision with Rukavina.

The Settlement Agreement with

Barney specifically provides, in clear and unambiguous language,
that CTX will honor the option agreement contained in the lease
with Rukavina.
By filing this action CTX breached the terms of its
Settlement Agreement by asserting, that the option is unenforceable
and

by

refusing

to

honor

the

option

exercised

by

Rukavina.

Furthermore, any potential defense to the enforcement of the option
agreement was waived by CTX in the Settlement Agreement.

Surety

Life Ins. Co. v. Rupp., 853 P.2d 366, 370 (Ut.App. 1992) (a party
may legally contract to waive a defense); Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortcr. , 701 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1985), (finding
of trial court on summary judgment that unambiguous language in
guaranty agreement waives guarantors' defenses is affirmed).
Since Rukavina

is a third party beneficiary

to the

Settlement Agreement, which specifically provides that CTX will
honor the option entered into with Rukavina, and this is a separate
agreement from the lease itself, Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the
Settlement Agreement with Barney should not have been summarily
stricken by the Court based on the Court's interpretation of the
separate lease agreement entered into by Rukavina.
Rukavina is entitled to the enforcement of the terms of
the

Settlement

Agreement

with

Barney

- 9 -

to protect

his rights.

Cerritos Trucking Co.
1982)

v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah

(action for specific performance of option agreement

to

purchase realty granted and affirmed); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627
P.2d 528 (Utah 1981) ; Garland v. Fleisch. 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992) .
G.

THE TRIAL COURT FOR ERRED IN RETROACTIVELY
REINSTATING

THE APRIL 20, 1993

JUDGMENT.

The trial court erred in reinstating the April 20, 1993
Judgment which was previously vacated for lack of standing and
jurisdiction. Utah Statute 16-I0a-1502 U.C.A., precludes a foreign
corporation from bringing or maintaining an action in the State
until an application is filed with the division.

Therefore, the

court does not have jurisdiction over any matter brought by a
foreign corporation until an application is filed.

This standing

and thus, jurisdiction, cannot be applied retroactively.
v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) .

Stephens

§ 68-3-3 U.C.A. specifi-

cally provides that a statute shall not be retroactively applied,
unless it is so declared in the statute.
The

subsequent

subsection,

§

16-l0a-1502(3)

U.C.A.,

allows the court to say a proceeding, until it determines whether
the foreign corporation is required to file an application and if
so the court is to further stay the proceeding until an application
has been filed.
CTX may proceed to obtain judgment, but only after an
application has been filed. By reinstating the Judgment, the court
has allowed CTX to totally circumvent the requirements of § 16-iOa1502(1), and by holding that the proceedings taken by CTX while an

- 10 -

unregistered corporation are merely voidable and not void, the
court has rendered the total section of no effect.
Consistent with the language in the statute and to render
the statute its intended effect, the better interpretation is that
the matter is stayed and that any proceedings are stayed and thus
void, until an application has been filed.
H.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
RUKAVINA'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT.

The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing
Rukavina to amend his complaint.

CTX was not unfairly prejudiced

and had plenty of opportunity to answer the amended complaint,
complete discovery and prepare for trial.
The

Third

Party

Defendants

(as

principals

of

the

Plaintiff CTX) were well aware of the action, and Third Party
Defendant Barney actually accepted service of the Third Party
Complaint and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
Rule

15 URCP, provides

that

a party may

amend

his

pleading by leave of court and that leave of court shall be freely
given when justice so requires.
considering

a motion

to amend

The primary considerations in
are, whether

the parties

have

adequate notice to meet the new issues, and whether any party
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage.

Rincrwood v. Foreign

Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Ut.App. 1990) cert, denied, 795
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664
P. 2d 455 (Utah 1983) (determination depends on whether opposing
party would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare).
- 11 -

In this case, there was no unfair advantage or unavoidable prejudice due to not enough time to prepare.

On November 18,

1994, pursuant to the court's own Order a Scheduling Conference was
held wherein cut-off dates and deadlines were set.

A discovery

deadline was set for February 28, 1995. A motion deadline was set
for December 9, 1994.

The court set a hearing date on all motions

for January 30, 1995 at 1:30. (Record 303). Rukavina's Motion to
Amend was filed on the deadline set by the court, December 9, 1994
(Record 310) and well before the discovery deadline.
CTX was not unduly prejudiced and had ample opportunity
to conduct

further discovery

and prepare

for any new issues.

Rukavina's Motion to Amend was filed within the time deadline set
by the court and relied upon by Rukavina.

The court abused its

discretion and Rukavina was unduly prejudiced, by the court's
denial of Rukavina's Motion to Amend in this case when Rukavina
filed his motion on the deadline set by the court, and well before
the discovery deadline.
I.

THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED AFTER BARNEY ACCEPTED SERVICE.

Rule 4(b) URCP, provides that "in any action brought
against two or more defendants on which service has been obtained
upon one of them within the 12 0 days or such longer period as may
be allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or
appear at any time prior to trial."
The Third Party Complaint as against Barney should not
have been dismissed for untimely service under Rule 4(b) URCP after
Barney agreed to accept service in the case and filed an Answer to
- 12 -

the Third

Party Complaint.

Any claim regarding

service of Barney was thereby waived.

the untimely

The Court's dismissal,

although without prejudice, greatly adds to the delay and cost of
litigation and therefore, should not be allowed in this case.
Rule 4 (b) URCP provides that once one defendant is served
the other defendants can be served or appear at any time prior to
trial.

This is to prevent the preclusion of adding additional

defendants after three months.

Valley Asphalt, Inc., v, Eldon J.

Stubbs Contsr., Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986) .

Barney, one of

the Third Party Defendants in this case was served and therefore
Wright, as an additional Third Party Defendant in this action, may
be served at any time prior to trial.

Id.

The trial court erred in dismissing
Complaint against Wright under Rule 4 URCP.

the Third Party

The court certainly

erred in dismissing Barney from the case after Barney had already
accepted service of the Third Party Complaint and had filed an
Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court

erred

in

enforcing

the

settlement

agreement in this case, based on two letters proposing a global
settlement of five cases, which was never agreed to by all the
parties.
The court erred in failing to make an initial determination, considering all the evidence, as to whether the parties
intended the option provision to be an integrated contract, before
ruling on the exclusion of parol evidence.
- 13 -

The
pleadings,

trial

finding

enforceable,

when

court

erred

in

granting

the option provision
there

was

a definite

calculating the purchase price.

too

judgment

on

indefinite

method

agreed

the

to be
to

for

The trial court erred in finding

that the option provision was not ambiguous, so as to allow parol
evidence to determine its meaning.
The trail court erred in striking Rukavina's Motion to
Enforce the Settlement Agreement

entered

in CTX v. Barney, a

separate case, when Rukavina was clearly an intended beneficiary.
The trial court erred in retroactively reinstating a
judgment entered when CTX had no standing and the court had no
jurisdiction over the matter.
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Rukavina's Motion

to Amend and

in dismissing

the Third

Party

Complaint, when Third Party Defendant, Barney had accepted service
and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT
This Court should reverse the trial court's final Order,
and find that there was no global settlement reached as proposed in
the two letters of counsel, and

that CTX is not entitled

to

unilaterally change the terms of the global settlement discussed,
to enforce settlement in this case only, while proceeding with
litigation in this case, as well as, the other cases.
This Court should find that the option provision was not
intended as an integrated contract and that it is ambiguous, thus
requiring the consideration of parol evidence.
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This Court, upon

consideration of all the evidence, should find that there was a
definite method agreed to for calculating the purchase price, and
thus, the option is enforceable as a matter of law.
This Court should vacate the trial court's Judgment on
the Pleadings and allow Rukavina to file his amended pleadings, to
proceed against the Third Party Defendants, and be entitled to have
a hearing on the merits of his Motion to Enforce the Settlement
Agreement entered into between CTX and Barney.
DATED this 9th day of September, 1996.
SMITH & HANNA

By:
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